The common wisdom in the field of quantum information theory is that when a system is initially correlated with its environment, the map describing its evolution may fail to be completely positive. If true, this would have practical and foundational significance. We here demonstrate, however, that the common wisdom is mistaken. We trace the error to the standard argument for how the evolution map ought to be defined. We summarize this standard argument and then show that it sometimes fails to define a linear map or any map at all. Further, we show that these pathologies persist even in completely classical examples. Drawing inspiration from the framework of classical causal models, we argue that the correct definition of the evolution map is obtained by considering a counterfactual scenario wherein the system is reprepared independently of any systems in its causal past while the rest of the circuit remains the same, yielding a map that is always completely positive. In a post-mortem on the standard argument, we highlight two distinct mistakes that retrospectively become evident (in its application to completely classical examples): (i) the types of constraints to which it appealed are constraints on what one can infer about the final state of a system based on its initial state, where such inferences are based not just on the cause-effect relation between them-which defines the correct evolution map-but also on the common cause of the two; (ii) in a (retrospectively unnecessary) attempt to introduce variability in the input state, it inadvertently introduced variability in the inference map itself, then tried to fit the input-output pairs associated to these different maps with a single map.
INTRODUCTION
Quantum state evolution is typically represented by a completely positive linear map. There are two justifications that are usually given for doing so. The first (the axiomatic justification) is that one always has the freedom to implement a quantum evolution map on a subsystem of some composite system, and complete positivity is then required in order for the state of the composite to remain positive. 1 The second justification notes that the evolution of an isolated system is always described by a unitary map. This implies that the most general sort of evolution of an open system arises by unitarily coupling the system to an environment (in some fixed state) and then tracing over the environment, and such evolution is always represented by a completely positive map.
However, the common wisdom in the field of quantum information is that there is an exception to the rule that the evolution of quantum states is represented by completely positive maps, namely, when the initial state of the system-environment composite does not factorize. For instance, Nielsen and Chuang [ [1] , Sec. 8.5] state that "a quantum system which interacts with the * dschmid@perimeterinstitute.ca 1 It is important to preserve the positivity of states, since otherwise there would be measurements for which the probabilities assigned to their outcomes (by the Born rule) would not be positive numbers.
degrees of freedom used to prepare that system after the preparation is complete will in general suffer a dynamics which is not adequately described within the quantum operations formalism", (here, "quantum operations" refer to completely positive trace-preserving linear maps), and that "It is an interesting problem for further research to study quantum information processing beyond the quantum operations formalism"
The literature that has arisen around the claim of the inadequacy of completely positive maps for describing quantum state evolution provides a great diversity of examples purporting to support the claim. These articles have various aims, but the overarching goal seems to be to understand the precise circumstances under which completely positive maps are inadequate for describing quantum state evolution and to take up the challenge of determining the implications for quantum information processing.
We will here demonstrate that the common wisdom is mistaken and we will clarify in what ways the standard argument went wrong. We will show that the correct definition of the evolution map in cases where there are initial system-environment correlations arises from a quantum analogue of the notion of a 'do-conditional' from the classical framework for causal modelling [25] . Doconditionals were introduced explicitly to describe the arXiv:1806.02381v2 [quant-ph] 24 Jul 2018 inferences that can be made from one variable to another based on a cause-effect relation when these variables also exhibit correlations due to a common cause. A particular example of a cause-effect relation is the relation between the initial and final versions of a system undergoing evolution, and a particular example of when these are also influenced by a common cause is when the system is initially correlated with an environment that it later interacts with. So it is natural that the quantum analogue of a do-conditional serves to define the evolution map, and such a definition implies that the map is always completely positive.
Pursuing a quantum generalization of the classical framework of causal modelling has already had many interesting applications in quantum foundations, including: revealing a quantum advantage for causal inference [26] , uncovering new experimental scenarios wherein there is a gap between quantum and classical correlations [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] , uncovering a promising approach to achieving a causal explanation of Bell inequality violations without finetuning [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] , expanding the set of experimental configurations wherein one can achieve quantum state pooling [39] , and exploring the possibility of quantum uncertainty about the causal structure [40] [41] [42] .
This article continues this trend by showing that the correct definition of a quantum evolution map in the presence of initial system-environment correlations requires a quantum generalization of a key notion from classical causal modelling, that of the do-conditional, thereby demonstrating the conceptual significance of the quantum version of this notion.
A. Outline of the paper Section 2 lays out the standard argument for the inadequacy of completely positive maps for describing evolution, abstracted from the various arguments found in the literature on the subject. We also give several examples in which the standard argument leads to problematic conclusions, and we ultimately show that it does not provide a valid definition of the evolution map.
In Section 3, we show that the pathological consequences of the standard argument arise even in purely classical scenarios. In Section 4, we describe how to define a classical evolution map in the presence of initial system-environemtn correlations, using the notion of doconditionals from the framework of classical causal models. In Section 5, we show that the standard argument generally fails to reproduce it, and we leverage the framework of classical causal models to elucidate the mistaken assumptions of the standard argument within the scope of classical scenarios.
In Section 6, we show that the definition of the classical evolution map generalizes naturally to a definition of the quantum evolution map, which is seen to be always completely positive and to avoid the pathologies of the standard argument. We then assess the mistakes of the standard arguments in the quantum sphere.
Finally, in Section 7 we discuss some of the implications of our definition of the quantum evolution map, we explain how it can be extracted from experimental data, and we advocate for a shift in research focus for opensystem quantum dynamics.
PATHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE STANDARD ARGUMENT

A. Preliminaries
First we recall some mathematical facts. Let L(H S ) denote the space of linear operators on the Hilbert space H S describing system S. We denote a map from L(H S1 ) to L(H S2 ) by E S2|S1 . Such a map is said to be trace-preserving if ∀ρ S1 ∈ L(H S1 ) : Tr S2 [E S2|S1 (ρ S1 )] = Tr S1 (ρ S1 ). It is said to be positivity-preserving, or simply positive, if it takes all positive operators to positive operators, ∀ρ S1 ≥ 0 : E S2|S1 (ρ S1 ) ≥ 0. It is said to be completely positivity-preserving, or simply completely positive, if its action on a composite system is also positive; that is, for any ancillary system, denoted E 1 at the initial time and E 2 at the final time, and evolving by the identity map, id E2|E1 , we have ∀ρ S1E1 ≥ 0, (E S2|S1 ⊗ id E2|E1 )(ρ S1E1 ) ≥ 0.
Suppose that the principal system S is coupled to an ancillary system E by a unitary U SE , that E is prepared at the initial time in the state ρ E and that one traces over the ancillary system to obtain the final state of the principal system. The evolution of the principal system is then represented by the map E S2|S1 ( S1 ) : L(H S1 ) → L(H S2 ) defined by E S2|S1 ( S1 ) = Tr E [U S1E ( S1 ⊗ ρ E )U † S1E ].
(
Note that throughout this article we denote the argument of a map by A , where the subscript specifies the type of system at the input. Clearly, such a map is completely positive and trace-preserving. It turns out, furthermore, that any completely positive trace-preserving map can be realized in this fashion, a result known as the Stinespring dilation theorem [43] .
B. The standard argument for the inadequacy of completely positive maps
We now review the standard argument for the inadequacy of completely positive maps in describing the evolution of the quantum state of the principal system (which we henceforth simply call 'the system') when it is initially correlated with the environment [1, 4, 8-10, 12-14, 16-21] .
To assume that the system and environment are initially correlated is to assume that their joint state does not factorize, that is, ρ S1E = ρ S1 ⊗ ρ E . The system and environment are imagined to subsequently interact according to the map
where U : H S1 ⊗ H E → H S2 ⊗ H E is a unitary operator. This scenario is depicted in Fig. 1 .
An initially correlated state of system and environment, ρS 1 E , evolves according to a quantum channel E S 2 |S 1 E .
The standard argument begins by presuming that the map representing the system's evolution, denoted by E S2|S1 , is constrained by the following equation:
where ρ S1 denotes the marginal on S 1 ,
and ρ S2 denotes the marginal on S 2 ,
However, Eq. (3) only specifies how a single state of the system, namely ρ S1 , is transformed. This is clearly not sufficient to determine how an arbitrary state on S 1 is transformed, and therefore Eq. (3) does not serve to define a map uniquely.
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In order to define a map uniquely, it is critical that its action be specified on many different input states. Towards this end, most articles on the topic do not consider a single joint state on system and environment, but rather a set of such states with differing marginal states for the system. The specific means by which this variation is generated differs among proposals: one might apply a transformation on the system, or one might apply a joint transformation on the system and the environment, or one might imagine performing some non-destructive measurement on the system. Physically, it must be that some sort of laboratory operation induces variation on the initial system-environment state. We denote the random variable which encodes the setting of this operation by J and the random variable which encodes its outcome by K. For each pair of values (j, k) for these variables, the system-environment composite is prepared in a corresponding state ρ (j,k) S1E . The general circuit diagram representing the class of scenarios studied in the literature, then, is that of Fig. 2 . The standard argument asks us to consider the mathematical relation
where
and
which we term the input-output relation. It asserts that the evolution map
Note that one could only hope to uniquely define a map on all input states in this manner if the map is assumed to be linear and the domain of the input-output relation includes an informationally complete set of states (i.e., the set {ρ (j,k) S1 } j,k forms a basis of the operator space L(H S1 )).
The standard argument for the inadequacy of completely positive maps for describing the evolution of the quantum state of the system is concluded by noting that in many scenarios, the map which is defined by Eq. (9) fails to be completely positive. We provide a simple example of this type in the next section.
In fact, one can find examples wherein the prescription that is endorsed by the standard argument defines a map that is not linear, and other examples where it does not define any map at all. We provide such examples in the two subsequent sections. For each type of failure-the failure of complete positivity, the failure of linearity, and the failure to define a map-we explain why it casts doubt on the standard argument.
C. An example where the standard argument implies a map that is not completely positive This example is motivated by related examples in Refs. [19] and [44] .
Imagine that one achieves a variation over the initial state of the system-environment composite as follows: one first prepares it in the maximally entangled state with the environment, |φ
, and then for each value of a setting variable J, one implements upon it the binary-outcome measurement associated to the orthogonal basis {|ψ j,1 , |ψ j,2 } with von Neumann-Lúders state update rule and one post-selects on obtaining the first outcome, K = 1. Here, |ψ j,1 and |ψ j,2 form an orthogonal basis for the qubit Hilbert space.
This scenario is depicted in Fig. 3 . The part of the circuit that is conceptualized as the preparation of the joint state of system and environment (that is, the part which corresponds to the first gate in Fig. 2 ) is highlighted by a dashed box. This convention is followed in all of the examples we consider. Because the environment is initially correlated with the system, the state that one infers for it from the post-selection depends on the basis choice and the outcome, a phenomenon that is often termed quantum steering [45, 46] . Specifically, when one learns from the measurement that the quantum state of the system is |ψ j,1 , one infers that the state of the environment is ψ T j,1 , where T denotes transposition in the computational basis (since ψ| |φ + φ + | |ψ = ψ T ψ T for any ψ). Thus by varying the parameter J and conditioning on obtaining the first outcome of the measurement, K = 1, one obtains the set {ρ (j,1) S1E } j where
The subsequent system-environment interaction is presumed to implement the swap operation on their states. That is, U S2E |S1E is defined, via Eq. (2), by the operator
where SWAP(|φ ⊗ |χ ) := |χ ⊗ |φ for all χ and φ. By Eq. (8), we infer that the marginal states of the system (for each value of J) after the system-environment interaction are given by
The input-output relation in this case, therefore, is
If the projectors {|ψ j,1 ψ j,1 | S1 } j form a basis for the operator space L(H S1 ) (i.e., an informationally complete set), one can conclude that there is a unique linear map defined (via Eq. (9)) by this relation, namely, the transpose map. This is the canonical example of a map that is positive but not completely positive [1] .
i. Problematic implications of the failure of complete positivity
Even though the failure of completely positivity is obviously acknowledged by proponents of the standard argument (it is the reason this field of research even exists), we believe that it already provides good reasons for being suspicious of the argument.
An immediate worry is that such maps could lead to output states on system-ancilla composites that fail to be positive.
The standard response to this worry (found, for instance, in Ref. [12, 13] ) is that the map describing the evolution of the system in this circumstance is only applicable on a limited domain of input states, and that this domain of input states does not include the marginals of the set of entangled states which manifest the failure of the map to be completely positive.
Note, first of all, that this response is a denial of the axiomatic justification of complete positivity which we discussed in the introduction. The problem we see with this denial is that it forces one to give up on the notion that the map describing the evolution can support inferences about counterfactuals. This notion is central to the notion of evolution in physics: laws of motion are not just descriptions of historically actual motions, but prescriptions for determining what motion would occur for any initial condition. The possibility of making inferences about counterfactual scenarios is precisely what makes laws of motion so useful in practice. To entertain the idea that a map only describes the evolution of a system when that system is assured to be in one of a restricted set of states is to retreat from the usual conception of an evolution map.
D. An example where the standard argument implies a map that is not linear
The following example is a simplified version of the one presented in Nielsen and Chuang [1] .
Here, one initiates the system and environment in the state |0 S1 |0 E . K is trivial, and J ∈ {0, 1} acts as the control for a controlled-Hadamard gate on the system and for a controlled-NOT gate on the environment. The system-environment composite is therefore prepared in one of the states {ρ (j) S1E } j where
with |+ := 1 √ 2 (|0 + |1 ). Next, there is a controlled-XH gate with the environment qubit as control and the system qubit as target,
where XH denotes the unitary gate obtained by performing the Hadamard gate H followed by the Pauli gate X. This circuit is shown in Fig. 4 . By Eq. (8), we infer that the marginal states of the system after the system-environment interaction (for each value of J) are given by
Note that the map implied by the standard argument is not completely specified by these constraints. However, any map consistent with this relation must take nonorthogonal states to orthogonal states, and every such map is nonlinear. (Note that once one allows for the failure of linearity, even having a set of input states that span L(H S1 ) becomes insufficient to determine how the map acts on all states.)
i. Problematic implications of the failure of linearity
The fact that the standard argument does not always define a linear map is troubling, because the linearity of quantum transformations can be justified on numerous physical grounds. For example, representing a process by a nonlinear map violates the principle that processing of a system cannot increase the amount of information it contains about another system. Specifically, every such map violates the data processing inequality [1] . Such violations have physically problematic implications, such as the possibility of superluminal signalling [47] [48] [49] .
E. An example where the standard argument implies a relation that is not a map
Most pathologically, the standard argument can yield a relation which is inconsistent with any map whatsoever. This is illustrated by a simple example, motivated by one from Ref. [20] , and pictured in Fig. 5 .
Here, K is trivial, and for each value of J ∈ {0, 1}, one prepares a distinct initial joint state by performing a controlled-NOT gate on the system. In this way, the system-environment composite is prepared in one of the states {ρ
Next, there is a controlled-NOT gate with the environment qubit as control and the system qubit as target, with unitary description By Eq. (8), we infer that the marginal states of the system (for each value of J) after the system-environment interaction are given by
The relation defined by this scenario is
Because this relation is one-to-many, it does not define a map from L(H S1 ) to L(H S2 ).
i. Problematic implications of the failure of the standard argument to define a map
The standard argument purports to define the evolution map. However, we have just seen that it sometimes fails to define any map whatsoever. This failure strikes us as a decisive criticism. Proponents of the standard argument have not offered any satisfactory account of how their scheme can be salvaged in the face of this failure. We have provided three examples which illustrate distinct pathologies of the standard argument. Much previous work [4, 8-14, 16-19, 21] has focused on these distinctions, e.g., by seeking necessary or sufficient conditions for the relation to define a completely positive map, a linear map, and so on. The coming analysis shows that these questions are misguided: evolution maps are always completely positive, and all of the apparent counterexamples are really just indicative of the fact that the standard argument is not the correct way to define the evolution map.
Our examples differed also in the way in which they introduced variability in the initial state of the systemenvironment composite. Specifically, the variability was introduced (respectively) by (a) the choice of measurement on the system and the choice of post-selection on its outcomes, (b) the choice of transformation on the systemenvironment composite, and (c) the choice of transformation on the system alone. Roughly, all examples in the literature fit into one of these three special cases of the circuit of Fig. 2 . Some articles, however, left the operational (circuit) description of the problem unspecified [4, [12] [13] [14] [17] [18] [19] [20] , and took the problem description to be a (possibly continuous) set of initial states on S 1 E and a unitary system-environment interaction, U S2E |S1E . One consequence of our work is to show that this version of the problem is not well-posed; knowing the causal structure of the circuit is in fact critical to defining the evolution map.
3
Apart from their simplicity, there is nothing special about the examples we have chosen. In Appendix A, we show that each of the three circuit types can generate each of the pathologies of the standard argument. In particular, this means that one cannot evade such pathologies by restricting attention to one of the three special classes of circuits.
Furthermore, any sensible definition of the evolution map should satisfy a criterion of universality, namely, that it should be applicable regardless of the scenario. Many previous proposals have failed to satisfy this criterion. Most notably, we saw that the standard argument did not define an evolution map in the simple scenario of Fig. 1 . In other cases, the proposed definition of the evolution map was applicable to a restricted class of circuits, where the restriction was ad hoc insofar as no justification was given other than to avoid the pathologies that would otherwise result. For example, Refs [23, 50] recognized that certain scenarios yielded the pathology discussed in Section 2 E, and sought to avoid it by excluding such scenarios by fiat.
PERSISTENCE OF THE PATHOLOGIES OF THE STANDARD ARGUMENT IN THE CLASSICAL SPHERE
In a classical setting, one can also consider the evolution map for a system when there are initial correlations between the system and environment. In this section, we demonstrate that if one tries to define this classical evolution map using the prescription endorsed by the standard argument, then one obtains all of the same problematic implications that one saw quantumly. (This should already be evident given that for many of the quantum examples we presented (above, and in the appendix) all the states and maps could be dephased in the computation basis without affecting our conclusions.) Therefore, although it is a widely held belief that the surprising form of quantum evolution maps in cases of initial system-environment correlations is just another example of a counterintuitive feature of quantum theory (so-called 'quantum weirdness'), we will demonstrate that it should be taken instead as evidence of the fallacy of the standard argument for how to define the evolution map.
A. Classical Preliminaries
A classical system is described by a set of physical states, which can be encoded as values of a random variable S. The statistical state of the classical system is given by a probability distribution P S over the possible physical states of the system. More precisely, if Λ S denotes the set of possible values of S (here assumed discrete), then P S : Λ S → [0, 1] denotes the function over Λ S , and P S (s) denotes the probability that S = s. P S satisfies the normalization condition S P S = 1, where S P S denotes the function on S defined by ∀s ∈ Λ S : ( S P S )(s) := s P S (s) and where the right-hand side of the condition denotes the function that takes value 1 for all s.
We are interested in the evolution of these probability distributions for a system interacting with an environment. We will denote the space of probability distributions on S by P(S), and for later convenience we introduce the following notation:
A map Γ S2|S1 : P(S 1 ) → P(S 2 ) is called stochastic if there exists a conditional probability distribution P S2|S1 such that
Note that this is a linear map. The most general manner in which a probability distribution on a classical system can evolve is by a stochastic map. As with one of the justifications of the use of completely positive maps in quantum theory, one can justify the use of stochastic maps in classical theories as follows: if one imagines that an ancillary system is prepared in some fixed distribution, and the system-ancilla composite is subjected to a deterministic dynamics, and then the ancilla is ignored, then the resulting map on the probability distribution over the system is always stochastic. Stochastic maps are also the most general type of map that preserve positivity for all input distributions. The standard argument applies just as well to classical scenarios as to quantum scenarios, since the former are a strict subset of the latter, where all operators are diagonal in some fixed basis. A classical scenario can be described by the same sort of circuit as a quantum scenario: one simply replaces quantum states by probability distributions and unitary operations by deterministic functions. Hence we can consider a direct analogy for each of the quantum circuits considered previously. The classical analogue for the general circuit from Fig. 2 is shown in Fig. 6 , where F S2E |S1E represents a stochastic map P(S 1 ) ⊗ P(E) → P(S 2 ) ⊗ P(E ) induced by a deterministic dynamics, so that
for some functions f and g. Applying the standard argument for defining an evolution map to these classical scenarios, one simply computes
generating an input-output relation
as in the quantum case. The standard argument dictates that the map describing the evolution should be taken to be one which satisfies the constraints encoded in this relation; that is, a map
As we now show, this prescription for how to define the evolution map leads to the same sorts of pathologies we saw in the quantum case. There exist simple physical scenarios that generate relations which imply maps that are not stochastic, others which imply maps that are not linear, and still others which do not define any map at all.
Our examples of each of the three failures are chosen to be analogous to the corresponding quantum examples. Note that S 1 , S 2 and E are now taken to denote classical random variables rather than being mere labels of systems.
C. A classical example where the standard argument implies a map that is not stochastic
Our example of the failure of stochasticity classically is analogous to our example of the failure of complete positivity quantumly (described in Section 2 C) and is realized with a circuit of exactly the same form (shown in Fig. 3 ).
Consider a system and an environment that each have four possible physical states, so that S 1 , E ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. The pair are first prepared in the joint distribution P S1E := [33] ) SE . System S 1 is then subjected to one of three measurements, determined by the value of a ternary variable J and each with binary outcome K. The J = 1 measurement determines whether S 1 ∈ {2, 3} or not, J = 2 whether S 1 ∈ {1, 3} or not, and J = 3 whether S 1 ∈ {1, 2} or not. K = 1 labels the outcome wherein S 1 is found to be in the given set, and K = 0 the complementary set. We further imagine that these measurements are not passive, but disturb the value of the system variable. Specifically, the update rule is such that the final state on S 1 depends only on J and K: S 1 is prepared in a uniform distribution over the values of S 1 in the complementary set to the one that S 1 was found in. For instance, if the J = 1 measurement is done and the outcome K = 1 occurs, verifying that S ∈ {2, 3}, then S 1 is reprepared in the distribution
Finally, S 1 undergoes a swap operation with E. In our example, we consider only the cases where the outcome is found to be K = 1. For each possible value j of J, the joint distribution on S 1 and E, P (j,1) S1E , is as follows:
It follows that after the swap operation on the system and environment, the marginal state of S 2 , for each value
S2 , is as follows:
The input-output relation, therefore, is
This relation is consistent with a linear map,
where the probability distribution over the four physical states of S 1 is expressed as a vector, p S1 . However, this map is not stochastic (e.g., the columns do not each sum to one), and in fact there is no stochastic map consistent with the relation R above. To see this, note that the first ordered pair in R guarantees that physical state 0 has no probability of mapping to 0 or 1, the second ordered pair guarantees that it has no probability of mapping to 0 or 2, and the third ordered pair guarantees that it has no probability of mapping to 0 or 3. But every stochastic map is certain to map physical state 0 to some other physical state, in contradiction with these three constraints.
D. A classical example where the standard argument implies a map that is not linear
Next, we provide a classical example in which the standard argument yields a map Γ S2|S1 that fails to be linear. This is analogous to the failure of linearity in the quantum example of Section 2 D, and it is realized in a classical circuit of exactly the same form (shown in Fig. 4) .
The system-environment composite is prepared in one of two possible states, depending on the value of J:
The system-environment composite then undergoes the following joint evolution: if
The marginal states of the system (for each value of J) after the system-environment interaction are given by
The relation defined by this transformation is
Any map consistent with this relation must take overlapping distributions to non-overlapping distributions, and every such map is nonlinear.
E. A classical example where the standard argument does not define a map
Finally, we provide a classical example in which the standard argument fails to yield any map at all. This is an exact analogue of the quantum example of Section 2 E, so it is realized in a classical circuit of exactly the same form (shown in Fig. 5 ).
As in the quantum example, K is trivial, and for each value of J ∈ {0, 1}, one prepares a distinct initial joint state by performing a controlled-NOT gate on the system. In this way, the system-environment composite is prepared in one of the distributions {P (j) S1E } j , namely,
As before, the system-environment interaction is a controlled-NOT gate with the environment qubit as control and the system qubit as target, so that if
The corresponding input-output relation is
Since it is one-to-many, there is no map consistent with this relation.
F. Every classical pathology can be obtained from every classical circuit type
We have designed these specific classical examples to make the point as simply as possible (while maintaining a close analogy with the three quantum examples presented previously). As we show in Appendix B, however, there are infinite families of examples which exhibit each of the three pathologies, no matter which type of operational scenario ((a), (b), and (c) in Section 2 F above) one considers. These generic classical examples are analogous to the generic quantum examples in Appendix A.
THE CORRECT DEFINITION OF THE EVOLUTION MAP IN THE CLASSICAL SPHERE
In the quantum literature, some of the problematic examples we described earlier led researchers to question the notion that the evolution of quantum states is always described by a completely positive map. By contrast, no one has previously seen fit to cite the kinds of problematic classical examples that we have just described as a reason to question the claim that evolution of classical probability distributions is always described by a stochastic map. Why not? Could it simply be a failure to recognize the existence of problematic classical examples?
No. The reason no one has questioned the adequacy of stochastic maps is because in the classical sphere no one was inclined to endorse the technique of the standard argument for inferring the evolution map. Rather, the framework of causal modeling and the so-called do calculus was developed [25] , and this provided a scheme for inferring the evolution map on the system even in the presence of initial correlations between system and environment. It is found to differ significantly from that of the standard argument, and in particular it avoids all of the problematic implications. In this section, we will present this scheme, explain why it clearly yields the correct notion of an evolution map in the classical realm, and identify the mistaken assumptions in the standard argument.
The correct definition of an evolution map in the classical sphere generalizes easily to the quantum sphere, as we will show in Section 6.
A. The causal perspective on defining an evolution map
We begin with some reflections on the notion of an evolution map in a classical statistical theory. These are the ideas that underlie the calculus for causal reasoning that has been developed by Pearl [25] 4 .
An evolution map is not a mere description of the actual statistical states of the input and the output of a process, but a prescription for determining the statistical state of the output for any statistical state of the input, in analogy to what distinguishes a law of motion from a historical account (as we already noted in Section 2 C i). Just as a law of motion is autonomous from the initial conditions, an evolution map is autonomous from the state at its input: for any variation of the state of its input, the map is unchanged.
To define the evolution map from A to B in an arbitrary circuit, therefore, one considers the minimal modification to the circuit which allows one to freely vary the statistical state of A, while keeping the rest of the circuit unchanged. This minimal modification consists of altering the causal mechanism that determines A, while keeping every other causal mechanism in the circuit unchanged. (We have here made explicit use of the fact that the different causal mechanisms in the circuit are autonomous.) Because the way that B depends on A is only a function of these other causal mechanisms (and not a function of the mechanism that determines A), it is the same in the modified circuit as it is in the actual circuit. Therefore, the evolution map from A to B in the actual circuit can be identified with the map from A to B in the modified circuit. We denote the evolution map from A to B by Γ B|doA ( A ), in deference to the notion of a 'do-conditional' from classical causal modeling.
Recall the very first scenario we introduced, shown in Fig. 1 , and consider its classical analogue, shown in Fig. 7(a) . For such a circuit, one computes the evolution map from S 1 to S 2 by applying the prescription just given, as follows. One imagines that the naturally occurring state of S 1 is ignored, and instead a new state for S 1 is prepared, in a manner uncorrelated with the systems that would under natural circumstances be its causal parents. The counterfactual scenario being imagined is depicted in Fig. 7(b) . The wire labeled S 1 in the original circuit is mapped onto two wire fragments that are disconnected in the counterfactual circuit. The first, which inherits the label S 1 , maintains the causal ancestry of the original, but is traced out (denoted by the ground symbol from electronics). The second, which is labeled by S 1 , maintains the causal descendants of the original, and is an input to the counterfactual circuit.
The evolution map from S 1 to S 2 in the original circuit of Fig. 7(a) , Γ S2|do(S1) : P S1 → P S2 , is defined as the map which is isomorphic (under the identification of S 1 and S 1 ) to the map Γ S2|S 1 : P S 1 → P S2 in the counterfactual circuit of Fig. 7(b) , that is,
ter representation because it facilitates the comparison with the quantum case. Given that
where P E := S1 P S1E , it follows that the evolution map for the scenario of Fig. 7 (a) is
The classical causal models framework typically focuses on the do-conditional P S2|doS1 , rather than the evolution map Γ S2|doS1 , but the latter is simply obtained from the former via
Eq. (55) implies that the evolution map can be computed directly from the identity of the circuit elements in the original circuit of Fig. (1) . This is because it depends only on F S2E |S 1 E and P E (which is obtained from P S1E by marginalization).
It follows, in particular, that there is no need to consider an input-ouput relation. This is in contrast to the standard argument, which (because of its insistence on starting with the input-output relation) cannot define a map uniquely unless the scenario explicitly involves a set of initial states. This is why, as we noted in Sec. 2, the standard argument cannot define a map for the circuit of Fig. (1) and why it is forced to consider circuits of the form of Fig. (2) , where there are variables J and/or K that allow one to introduce variation in the input state.
Note that we are here discussing how to define the evolution map when one has a complete description of the form of the circuit and the identity of each of its elements. The question of how one obtains such a description is not relevant to the definitional question, and it is important not to confuse the two questions. We will discuss the question of how to infer the quantum evolution map from experimental data in Section 7 C.
B. Contrasting the evolution map with the inference map
In the causal modeling framework [25] , the primary motivation for introducing do-conditionals was to distinguish them from standard conditionals. We pause here to describe the distinction because it is critical to our analysis of the mistakes of the standard argument.
Suppose that one considers the map defined by the standard conditional P S2|S1 , namely,
The correct way of interpreting the map defined in Eq. (57) This distinction is often illustrated by Simpson's paradox. This is a scenario in which there is a positive correlation between a treatment variable and a recovery variable, even though the causal influence of the treatment is to reduce the probability of recovery (see Sec. 6 of [25] ). The positive correlation is the result of there also being a common cause acting on the two variables. For instance, if men are more likely than women to seek the treatment and are also more likely than women to recover regardless of treatment, then gender acts as a common cause. In this circumstance, learning that an individual in the sample population got the treatment warrants assigning a higher likelihood to the proposition that that individual recovered, simply because learning that someone got the treatment is positive evidence for them being male, which in turn is positive evidence for them recovering.
If one naïvely computes P R|T = P RT /P R (where R is the recovery variable and T is the treatment variable), or equivalently, the map Γ R|T (via Eq. (57)), it is clear that this does not represent the cause-effect relation that exists between T and R and hence cannot be used to make assessments of the effectiveness of the treatment. Only the map Γ R|doT , computed from P R|doT (via Eq. (56)), wherein the intervention on T rules out the possibility of inference via a common cause, represents state updating based purely on the cause-effect relation. It is precisely for this reason that correlation does not imply causation.
To draw conclusions about whether a given treatment contributes causally to recovery, one must consider what would occur in a trial wherein the value of the treatment variable is assigned at random (drug or placebo, for instance), independently of any preferences of the individual. The do-conditional describes what would occur in such randomized trials.
Hence, we see that the evolution map is generally distinct from the inference map.
Finally, note that-just as we saw for the evolution map-the inference map in classical scenarios can be computed directly from the original circuit elements, so that one need not consider any sort of input-output relation. To see this, first note that the conditional P S2|S1 can be expressed as
The assumption that the circuit elements in Fig. 7 (a) are known implies that F S2E |S1E and P S1E are known. P S2E |S1E in the above equation is just the conditional associated to the stochastic map F S2E |S1E , while P E|S1 can be computed from P S1E by P E|S1 = P S1E /P S1 where P S1 = E P S1E . The inference map Γ S2|S1 associated to the conditional P S2|S1 is then found, via Eq. (57), to be:
THE MISTAKEN ASSUMPTIONS OF THE STANDARD ARGUMENT IN THE CLASSICAL SPHERE
With the causal point of view in mind and the correct definition of the evolution map in hand, it is very instructive to revisit the standard argument in the classical sphere and to isolate the mistaken assumptions therein.
A. The mistake of confusing the evolution map with the inference map
Consider what the standard argument entails for the simple circuit of Fig. 7(a) . There is only a single distribution P S1 and a single distribution P S2 , and so the inputoutput relation consists of a single input-output pair, namely, {(P S1 , P S2 )}. The standard argument is committed to the notion that this input-output pair can be interpreted as a constraint on the evolution map, namely, that the evolution map acting on P S1 must yield P S2 .
Classical probability theory dictates that the relationship which holds between P S1 and P S2 is
and consequently, if Γ S2|S1 is the stochastic map associated to the conditional P S2|S1 by Eq. (57), then
But Γ S2|S1 is the inference map from S 1 to S 2 , which can differ from the evolution map Γ S2|doS1 , as discussed in Sec. 4 B. Consequently, the input-output pair {(P S1 , P S2 )} is only guaranteed to be consistent with the inference map and is not guaranteed to be consistent with the evolution map. Indeed, if there is a common cause acting on S 1 and S 2 , as is the case in the circuit of Fig. 7(a) , then generically the evolution map and the inference map do differ, and the input-output pair {(P S1 , P S2 )} is only consistent with the inference map and not the evolution map.
To assume, as the standard argument does, that the input-output pair {(P S1 , P S2 )} constitutes a constraint on the evolution map is to make a mistake akin to inferring causation from correlation alone. For instance, it is akin to inferring, from a positive correlation between treatment and recovery, that treatment has a positive causal influence on recovery even though there is a common cause (such as gender) that could account for this positive correlation. This is the first mistake of the standard argument.
As we discuss in Appendix C, the inference map and the evolution map coincide if and only if E and S 1 are marginally independent, P S1E = P S1 ⊗P E . This is ironic, because proponents of the standard argument were interested in characterizing precisely those scenarios which violated this condition.
B. The mistake of taking input-output pairs from different inference maps as constraints on a single map
Proponents of the standard argument sought to define a map through an input-output relation R where variability in the input state of the system S 1 (and therefore also the output state of S 2 ) was introduced via variation in the values of J and K in a circuit of the form of Fig. 6 . Since, as noted in the previous section, an individual input-output pair in R is not a constraint on the evolution map, the set of such pairs obviously does not constrain the evolution map either. This would seem to leave open the possibility that the set of input-output pairs might still constrain the inference map. However, this is not the case either. If confusing inference with evolution had been the only mistake of the standard argument, then because every inference map is a stochastic map, one would never have found any failure of the inputoutput relation to define a stochastic map, contrary to what is found in the pathological examples.
The standard argument not only fails to find the evolution map, it also fails to find the inference map, due to a second mistaken assumption, which we now discuss.
As we argued in Section 4 B, the inference map in classical scenarios can be computed directly from the circuit, without introducing a set of initial states indexed by J and K. Therefore, introducing explicit variation in the initial state was unnecessary. Moreover, it is the root of all the pathological implications of the standard argument.
The means by which variability was introduced in the input state inadvertently led to variability in the inference map as well. That is, for generic examples of circuits to which the standard argument has been applied (those of the form of Fig. 6 ), the variation in the values of J and K leads not only to variation in the marginal state of the system S 1 , but also to variation in P E|S1 , and hence, given Eq. (58), to variation in the inference map.
To show this, we determine the formula that relates the conditional probability P S1|JK to P S2|JK for circuits of the form of Fig. 6 .
By definition,
To express P S2|JK as a function of P S1|JK , we simply make a repeated application of an identity from Bayesian probability theory, namely, P AB|C = P A|BC P B|C . We infer that P S2S1E|JK = P S2|S1EJK P E|S1JK P S1|JK and consequently that
For a circuit of the form of Fig. 6 , the causal structure ensures that S 2 is conditionally independent of JK given S 1 E, so that P S2|S1EJK = P S2|S1E , and we conclude that
This defines a JK-dependent map from distributions on S 1 to distributions on S 2 , namely, defining P
the map is
Rewriting in terms of the circuit elements given in our scenario (as was done in Eq. (60)), this map has the form:
For one who knows that J = j and K = k, the latter map is the correct way of making inferences from S 1 to S 2 . The inference map depends on one's knowledge of J and K.
It
then the input-output pair {(P
S2 )} is consistent with the map Γ (j,k) S2|S1 in the sense that
However, the prescription of the standard argument was to find a single map Γ S2|S1 such that
This last step is the origin of the pathologies of the standard argument. As Eq. (72) shows, in general the input-output pairs for different values of JK describe the input and output states of different maps. But the standard argument asks us to collect all of these input-output pairs into a single set, the input-output relation, and to try and find a single map that is consistent with all of them. Given the origin of these pairs, there is no guarantee that there is any such map, and even if there does happen to be one, there is no guarantee that it is linear or stochastic.
To summarize, the second mistake of the standard argument is to have inadvertently introduced variability in the inference map and then to have tried to define a unique map from the input-ouput pairs that are associated to these different inference maps.
C. The correct evolution map(s) for the scenarios considered by the standard argument
In the previous section, we noted that the inference map can be JK-dependent in the scenario of Fig. 6 . It turns out that the evolution map can also be JKdependent in this scenario. Generally, therefore, there is no single evolution map to be characterized in this scenario. Rather, following the prescription of Section 4 A one finds that there is a distinct map for each valuation (j, k) of J and K, namely,
where P (j,k) E is the marginal on E conditional on J = j and K = k.
At first glance, this may seem problematic, but in fact the knowledge-dependence of evolution maps is ubiquitous in both classical and quantum physics. We give several examples in Appendix D.
D. Illustrating the mistakes with the classical examples considered previously
Consider again the third classical example, discussed in Section 3 E, where the input-output relation failed to identify any map at all.
Recall that the example has no K variable, so only J is relevant. Consider the inference map from S 1 to S 2 for a particular value j of J. Specializing Eq. (69), this has the form
The coupling of system and environment implies that S 2 = S 1 ⊕ 2 E; that is, it implies that S 2 tracks the parity of S 1 and E. The controlled-NOT operation from J to S 1 toggles this parity in a J-dependent way, but without changing the marginal state of S 1 . Thus, as one varies J, one has variability in the state on S 2 , but no variability in the state on S 1 , leading to the one-to-many relation that fails to correspond to any map.
One way to understand the fact that different values of J lead to different states on S 2 is that E is correlated with J given S 1 , so that ∃e, s : P E|S1J (e|s, 0) = P E|S1J (e|s, 1), or equivalently (given Eq. (70)), P Indeed, as we show in Appendix E, the inference maps for the two values of J are S2|S2 . However, if one mistakenly considers both input-output pairs to be associated to a single map, one finds a contradiction. This illustrates the second mistake of the standard argument.
The first mistake of the standard argument is also illustrated in this example.
The correct evolution map in this example is straightforward to identify using the prescription of Section 4 A. For both values of J, the marginal state of the environment is uniformly random, so the evolution map is Jindependent and equal to the randomizing map
which takes any input probability distribution on S 1 to a uniformly random distribution on S 2 . This is distinct from either of the inference maps Γ
S2|S1 or Γ
S2|S1 , and so confirms that the evolution map is not constrained at all by the input-output pairs of the standard argument. Now consider the second classical example, discussed in Section 3 E.
Again, only the J variable is nontrivial in this example. However, whereas J was a cause of S 1 alone in the third classical example, here it is a cause of E as well. In fact, J is the complete common cause of S 1 and E and consequently E is conditionally independent of S 1 given J, P E|S1J = P E|J . Thus, Eq. (69) specializes to the expression
for the inference map from S 1 to S 2 in this example. Different values of J lead to different marginals on E, and therefore different inference maps. The inference map for J = j is
as shown in Appendix E. For any state of knowledge of S 1 , one should assign the same state of knowledge to S 2 if J = 0, and the same state of knowledge modulo an increase of the value by 1 (in arithmetic modulo 3) if J = 1. Again, one can check explicitly that in this example an individual input-output pair for J = j, (as in Eqs. (43) and (45)), is a constraint on the inference map for J = j. However, if one mistakenly considers both input-output pairs to be associated to a single map, then the only maps consistent with the constraint are nonlinear.
In this example, it happens that the evolution map for a particular value j of J coincides with the inference map for that same value,
The reason is that conditioning on J makes S 1 and E independent, so that in the presence of this conditioning, one need not intervene on the system to achieve this independence. The analysis of the first classical example is similar, and is also provided in Appendix E.
The situation in the classical sphere can be summarized as follows. The only sensible notion of an evolution map classically is the one defined by a do-conditional, but the information used by the standard argument to try to infer the system's evolution-input-output pairs of statistical states-does not constrain the evolution map but instead only constrains the inference map. Furthermore, even if one were content to try to identify the inference map rather than the evolution map, the standard argument does not provide a means of doing so because it takes a number of input-output pairs for different inference maps and mistakenly takes them all to be constraints on a single map.
THE CORRECT DEFINITION OF THE EVOLUTION MAP IN THE QUANTUM SPHERE
The definition of a classical evolution map, presented in Section 4, generalizes naturally to the definition of a quantum evolution map. It suffices to substitute the quantum analogues of the relevant classical notions (quantum states for statistical states and unitary dependences for functional dependences) in the definition provided there.
The ideas underlying the definition are the same as those outlined in Section 4 A: an evolution map for quantum states of a system is a prescription for determining the quantum state of the output for any quantum state of the input, and it is autonomous from the state at its input.
Just as in the classical case, one imagines the minimal modification to the circuit which allows one to freely vary the quantum state of A, while keeping the rest of the circuit unchanged; the evolution map from A to B in the actual circuit can then be identified with the map from A to B in the modified circuit. We denote an evolution map from quantum system A to quantum system B by E B|doA ( A ), where the "doA" on the right of the conditional parallels the classical notation and is a reminder that the definition requires contemplating an intervention on A.
Let us return to the most basic quantum circuit wherein the system and environment are initially correlated, that of Fig. 1 , reproduced here as Fig. 8(a) . For this case, the relevant counterfactual scenario is depicted in Fig. 8(b) . We again denote the version of the system which is varied counterfactually by S 1 , and here the ground symbol from electronics represents the trace over a subsystem. The hypothetical circuit which aids in defining the evolution map for the situation in (a).
The evolution map from S 1 to S 2 in the circuit of Fig. 8(a) , denoted E S2|doS1 : L(H S 1 ) → L(H S2 ), is defined as the map which is isomorphic (under the identification of S 1 and S 1 ) to the map E S2|S 1 : Fig. 8(b) ; that is,
This prescription unambiguously leads one to identify the evolution map to be
where ρ E := Tr S1 (ρ S1E ). This is the quantum analogue of Eq. (55). It is always completely positive. The quantum evolution map can be deduced from the identity of the circuit elements in the original circuit of Fig. 8(a) because it depends only on U S2E |S 1 E and on ρ E (which is obtained from ρ S1E by taking a partial trace). No input-output relation is needed.
Furthermore, like its classical counterpart, the quantum evolution map is knowledge-dependent insofar as it depends on one's information about the environment, encoded in the quantum state ρ E . 5 As we discuss in Appendix D, this knowledge-dependence of one's description of evolution is ubiquitous in physics, including textbook quantum mechanics.
For completeness, in Appendix F we determine the correct evolution map for each of the three quantum examples from Section 2. We also show that the most general circuit of the standard argument, Fig. 2 , is described by a distinct evolution map for each valuation (j, k) of J and K:
A. What is an inference map quantumly?
Once one takes a causal point of view, the description of quantum evolution is scarcely more complicated than the description of classical evolution. Devising a complete framework for describing inference in quantum theory, however, is a much more complicated venture, and remains an open problem [35, 39, 51] .
Classically, a passive observation of a variable does not change the dependence of that variable on its causal parents. So, there is a way to update one's knowledge of S 1 , and therefore the distribution P S1 , without changing any of the causal mechanisms that relate S 1 to the other variables of interest. In the quantum realm, however, it is unclear whether there is an appropriate analogue of passive observation given that every attempt to gain information 5 Some previous works (e.g. Refs. [19, 20] ) sought to define the evolution map as a function of the marginal state of the environment and also as a function of the initial system-environment correlations present in the initial state of the composite. This prescription is distinct from that of the standard argument, but it does not correspond to our prescription. In particular, it does not reproduce the correct evolution map (of Eq. (82)) because the latter depends only on the marginal state of the environment.
about a system changes its state. Consequently, it would seem to be impossible to update one's knowledge of S 1 , and therefore the state ρ S1 , without changing any of the causal mechanisms that relate S 1 to the other systems of interest. It is worth noting that even classically, it is only for a limited set of probing schemes on S 1 (which includes 'passive' measurements, which are non-disturbing and maximally informative) that the question of what one can infer about S 2 (given the outcome of the probing scheme) can be answered by an inference map that takes statistical states on S 1 as input. It follows that in the quantum case, it is also only for a limited set of probing schemes on S 1 that the question of what one can infer about S 2 could possibly be modeled by an inference map that takes quantum states on S 1 as input. Nonetheless, it is conceivable that there are intrinsically quantum scenarios wherein such an inference map can be defined.
For generic probing schemes (both classical and quantum), there is definitely no such map that takes a state of S 1 as input, but there may be an inference map that takes a state on two copies of S 1 as input. This is discussed in Section 7 B.
B. The mistakes of the standard argument in the quantum sphere
The set of quantum states and evolution maps includes the set of classical states and evolution maps as special cases (where all operators are diagonal in some fixed basis). The fact that the standard argument fails to identify the correct evolution map in various classical examples, therefore, implies that it is not a valid prescription for identifying the correct evolution map in the quantum sphere. Furthermore, the mistaken assumptions of the standard argument that we have identified by considering classical examples remain mistaken assumptions in the quantum sphere because of the inclusion of these classical examples.
What about intrinsically quantum examples? Although we have left open the question of whether one can make sense of the notion of an inference map from S 1 to S 2 in such examples, it is still clear that whenever one has initial system-environment correlations, the quantum systems S 1 and S 2 are causally related not only as cause and effect but by a common cause as well. As such, an individual input-output pair of states in such a scenario will generally not reflect the cause-effect relation alone. But given that the correct definition of the evolution map depends only on the cause-effect relation, there is no reason to think that an individual input-output pair of states is a constraint on the evolution map when there are initial system-environment correlations.
Indeed, as we show in Appendix G, the necessary and sufficient condition for an individual input-output pair to be a constraint on the evolution map is that the joint state on S 1 E factorizes, ρ S1E = ρ S1 ⊗ ρ E . The ironic conclusion (reached also in our discussion of the classical case) is that the only circumstance in which the first mistake of the standard argument would be innocuous is the case of no initial system-environment correlations.
If there is (as speculated in the previous section) a subset of intrinsically quantum scenarios where an inference map can be defined, and the scenario in question is presumed to be within this subset, then perhaps an inputoutput pair of states for a given value of JK could be taken as a constraint on the inference map. But it would still be the case that the inference map would vary with JK, and consequently it would be inappropriate to consider all of these input-output pairs as constraints on a single map, contrary to what is assumed in the standard argument.
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
We here summarize some of the lessons of our analysis. First, one cannot define an evolution map simply by listing a set of marginal states at its input and at its output, since if there is a common cause acting on the input and the output, then such pairs of states do not constitute constraints on the evolution map. Second, one should not restrict the input domain of the evolution map, as this would violate the counterfactual conception of evolution, embodied for instance in the idea that a law of motion should be autonomous from the initial conditions. Further, such restrictions are not needed to preserve complete positivity. Third, the marginal state of the environment is relevant to the evolution map, while the systemenvironment correlations are not. As the marginal state one assigns to the environment describes one's information about the environment, the evolution map one assigns depends on one's state of knowledge. If a scenario includes a variable that contains information about the environment, then that scenario is associated to a set of evolution maps rather than a single evolution map, one for each value of the variable.
We hope that these lessons might be valuable outside the scope of this work.
A. Composition of evolution maps
The definition of the quantum evolution map, Eq. (82), has the following feature: for a circuit of the form of Fig. 9 , the composition of the evolution map from S 0 to S 1 with the evolution map from S 1 to S 2 does not generally yield the evolution map from S 0 to S 2 ; that is, the compositional property E S2|doS0 = E S2|doS1 • E S1|doS0 fails to hold.
This compositional property only holds if S 1 constitutes the complete causal mediary between S 0 and S 2 . For the circuit in Fig. 9 , however, E 1 is also such a causal mediary, and so the only sequential decomposition of the evolution map from S 0 to S 2 that holds is the decomposition into an evolution map from S 0 to S 1 E 1 and an evolution map from S 1 E 1 to S 2 , that is, E S2|doS0 = E S2|doS1doE1 • E S1E1|doS0 . It is only with the correct definition of the evolution map that one can properly pose the question of how it can be decomposed into a temporal sequence of evolution maps. Therefore, we expect that our results will have relevance to questions about the divisibility of quantum channels and the detection of nonMarkovianity [52, 53] .
B. Causal maps
For the circuit of Fig. 8(a) , there is another counterfactual modification of it, depicted in Fig. 10(a) , that has been of prior interest. It is like the counterfactual circuit of Fig. 8(b) , but without the trace over S 1 . The natural map to associate with this circuit is of the form E S2S1|S 1 : L(H S 1 ) → L(H S1 ⊗ H S2 ), that is, from the inputs of the circuit to its outputs. Such a map encodes both the direct cause-effect relation (encoded in correlations between S 1 and S 1 ) and also the common cause (encoded in correlations between S 1 and S 2 ). In Refs. [26, 40] , it is referred to as the causal map.
The causal map contains all of the information that is contained in the evolution map. To see this, it suffices to note that, by Eq. (81), the trace over S 1 of the causal map is the definition of the evolution map, that is,
The causal map also serves to define an object that specifies what inferences can be made from S 1 to S 2 based only on the common cause relation that holds between them (whereas the evolution map specifies what inferences can be made based only on the cause-effect relation that holds between them). In order to be assured that one's inferences about S 2 are based purely on knowledge of S 1 , and not on S 1 , one presumes a state of complete ignorance regarding S 1 , represented by the completely mixed state
The object that allows one to make inferences based solely on the common cause relation, therefore, is the joint state
In particular, if one implements a measurement on S 1 and one obtains an outcome X = x associated to a positive operator E (x) S1 , then one should update one's description of S 1 to
where N is a normalization constant. This defines a map from effects on S 1 to states on S 2 which has been termed the steering map and discussed in [26] . It is linear and co-CP (that is, the composition of the map with the tranpose operation is completely positive).
Recall that obtaining a particular outcome X = x in a quantum non-destructive measurement with S 1 as input and S 1 as output is represented by a trace-nonincreasing completely positive map F (x) S 1 |S1 . If this outcome occurs when the measurement is implemented on system S 1 in a circuit described by the causal map E S2S1|S 1 , then how should one update the state of S 2 ? The answer is obtained by letting the S 1 output of the causal map E S2S1|S 1 become the input of the instrument map F (x) S 1 |S1 and by letting the instrument map's S 1 output become the S 1 input of the causal map. This sort of composition operation is depicted diagrammatically in Fig. 10(b) . We will denote it by • * , so that
This constitutes the most general way of updating one's description of S 2 based on a measurement on S 1 . Note that it need not conform to either updating via an evolution map E S2|doS1 nor updating of S 2 based on measurements of S 1 and initial correlations ρ S1S2 . It is conceivable that the causal map can be used to define a two-copy inference map, from S 1 and S 1 (the two copies of the system) to S 2 . One could then try to understand for what sorts of probing schemes this two-copy quantum inference map reduces to a quantum inference map from a single copy of S 1 to S 2 (the type whose possibility was discussed in Section 6 A).
An approach closely related to causal maps is that of Refs. [2, 3, 5, 6, 54] , where a map from quantum instruments to a state on S 2 was introduced, and termed a process tensor (or superchannel or M -map). More generally, much recent work on quantum causal modeling takes a similar approach, introducing two copies of each system in order to represent general quantum interventions [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] [61] .
C. Experimentally determining causal maps and evolution maps
Our focus herein has been on elucidating the correct definition of the evolution map when the circuit is completely specified. A secondary problem concerns deducing the evolution map from experimental data. (It is secondary insofar as it can only be answered once one has the correct definition of the evolution map).
It is clear that if one can experimentally characterize the different components of the circuit (the state ρ S1E and the unitary map U S2E |S1E ), then one can deduce the evolution map from Eq. (82). Although this is sufficient, it is not necessary for characterizing the evolution map. The question arises, therefore, of what is the minimal experimental effort that suffices.
To begin with, consider the idealization wherein one can perfectly implement any desired laboratory operation.
The causal map E S2S1|S 1 has input space L(H S 1 ) and output space L(H S1 ⊗ H S2 ) Hence, if one intervenes on the system by performing an informationally complete measurement on S 1 and then repreparing one of an informationally complete set of states on S 1 , and one also implements (for each state on S 1 ) an informationally complete measurement on S 2 , then one can tomographically reconstruct the causal map. This was termed causal tomography in Ref. [26] .
If one has experimentally determined the causal map, then the evolution map can be computed directly from it via Eq. (84). A less demanding experimental method, however, is to simply ignore S 1 (rather than measuring it) and prepare S 1 in one of an informationally complete set of states. For each such state, one then implements an informationally complete measurement on S 2 . This achieves process tomography on the evolution map. Note that this corresponds to experimentally implementing the intervention that is contemplated in the counterfactual circuit that defines the evolution map. It is analogous to measuring a classical do-conditional by implementing a randomized trial.
What about experimentally determining the causal map or evolution map when the experimenter does not have ideal laboratory operations? For example, what if they are not able to localize their operations to partic-ular systems, or to characterize their laboratory operations accurately? Because such limitations can result in inadvertently preparing initial system-environment correlations, they have previously served as a motivation for this field. Specifically, it has been suggested that if no completely positive map fits the relation of the standard argument, this should be taken as evidence that one has inadvertently introduced system-environment correlations [8, 62] .
Given our demonstration that the standard argument does not yield the evolution map, we advocate against analyzing experimental data in the manner it proposes, even if only as a diagnostic for imperfections in one's laboratory operations. The solution to the problem of imperfect laboratory operations is to use a form of tomography in which various features of the probing scheme (such as the identities of the laboratory operations and the dimensionality and nature of the systems being probed) are not presupposed, but are rather taken to be hypotheses whose plausibility is assessed on the basis of the data. In identifying the evolution map that provides the best fit to the experimental data, the maps over which one varies must be constrained to be completely positive (by virtue of the definition of an evolution map), and if the quality of the fit is poor (as is indicated, for instance, by a bad p-value), then the correct reaction is not to entertain the possibility that completely positive maps are inadequate for describing evolution, as has previously been suggested [8, 62] , but to reject one or more of the assumptions about features of the probing scheme. A demonstration of how to implement tomography in this way is provided in Ref. [63] .
Finally, we note that in classical scenarios, it is sometimes possible to identify the evolution map from purely passive observations if these are made on the right systems. (The more general problem of identifying the do-conditional for some pair of variables embedded in a given causal structure is known as the "identifiability problem" [25] .) The significance of this fact is that although evolution maps are defined in terms of hypothetical nonpassive interventions, these nonpassive interventions need not necessarily be performed in order to identify the map. Whether there is a sensible quantum analogue of the identifiability problem and whether it is possible to sometimes deduce the quantum evolution map without nonpassive interventions remains unclear. In particular, to even pose the question, one must explore whether there is anything in quantum theory that ought to be considered an analogue of passive observation.
CONCLUSION
We have shown that, for a general circuit wherein a system interacts with its environment such as the one in Fig. 1 , the evolution map on the system should be defined as in Eq. (82). This map is always linear and completely positive, even in the presence of arbitrary initial systemenvironment correlations. Thus, we have shown that the common wisdom that such initial correlations constitute an exception to the rule of complete postivity is mistaken.
Our results provide good reasons to abandon a host of questions that have previously been the primary focus of research in this field. There is no reason to find necessary or sufficient conditions under which one can find a completely positive map (or a linear map, a positive map, etc.) that is consistent with the input-output relation of the standard argument, because this relation has no bearing on the evolution map. There is also no reason to worry about the physical meaning of evolution maps that are not completely positive or not linear, because these never arise.
Instead, we advocate for pursuing a new set of questions, inspired by the drive to generalize the do-calculus of Ref. [25] to the quantum realm [37, 64] a. the choice of measurement on the system (and the choice of post-selection on its outcome).
b. the choice of transformation on the systemenvironment composite.
c. the choice of transformation on the system alone.
All of these are, of course, special cases of the general circuit in Fig. 2 . We have highlighted these three specific circuit types because they cover the range of operational scenarios considered in the literature. Roughly, scenarios of type (a) are considered in Refs. [2, 3, [5] [6] [7] ; of type (b) in Refs. [4, 7, 10, 16, 20] , and of type (c) in Refs. [2, 3, [5] [6] [7] . Furthermore, all examples in the literature, to our knowledge, fit within one of these three categories.
We now provide these nine families of examples (one for each pairing of 1, 2, 3 and a, b, c), in order to cover the full diversity of examples in the literature and to demonstrate explicitly that one cannot salvage the standard argument simply by restricting to one of the families of operational circuits (a, b, c).
For simplicity of presentation, we represent the systemenvironment interaction in these examples by a general quantum channel F S2|S1E rather than a unitary channel U S2E |S1E . (Of course, any such quantum channel could be dilated to recover a unitary description of the same example, although this dilation might require an increase in the dimensionality of the environment, to accommodate the ancilla required to achieve the dilation.)
Examples of types 1, 2, 3 will be given, respectively, by providing an operationally realizable relation such that 1. the set {σ j } j is informationally complete, and ∀j : τ j := T (σ j ), where T denotes the transpose map (relative to some basis), so that E is this transpose map and consequently is not completely positive.
2. the {τ j } j are more distinguishable 6 than the {σ j } j , so that E is necessarily a nonlinear map.
3. the σ j are independent of j (so ∀j : σ j :=σ for some fixedσ) but τ j varies nontrivially with j, so that the relation is one-to-many, and there can be no map E consistent with it.
a. Operational scenarios in which the setting variable J affects the system and the environment and K is trivial
Here we provide quantum examples of types (a, 1), (a, 2), and (a, 3) .
If the setting variable J influences both the principal system and the environment, one can prepare any initial joint state on the system and environment. Then, one can easily generate any relation R at all, including all three types from above. The following arguments can be seen as a generalization of arguments originating with Pechukas [9] .
For example, taking the environment system to have dimension equal to the cardinality of the set {σ j } j , then for any set {σ j } j one can prepare the system-environment joint state σ j ⊗ |j j| when J = j. The system and environment may then interact via the controlled channel F S2|S1E ( S1E ) = j j|(Tr S1 ( S1E ))|j E (τ j ) S2 , for any set of states {τ j } j on S 2 . Hence, for J = j the final marginal state of the system is τ j . Since both sets {σ j } j and {τ j } j are completely unconstrained, one can certainly satisfy any of the conditions articulated in 1, 2, and 3. Suppose that the initial state of the systemenvironment composite is a maximally entangled state. By the Hughston-Josza-Wootters theorem [65] , it is possible, by implementing a j-dependent measurement on the system and post-selecting on outcome k, to steer the environment to any arbitrary state τ j,k
7 . Further, the update rule of the measurement (which affects only the system) can be arbitrary. Given an outcome k of the jth measurement, one can find an update rule which ignores the state of the system and simply reprepares it in the state σ j,k . If the subsequent system-environment interaction is a swap gate, one can generate the input-output relation R = {(σ j,k , τ j,k )} j,k for completely unconstrained sets {σ j,k } j,k and {τ j,k } j,k . Hence, one can certainly satisfy the conditions of 1, 2, and 3 (where j is replaced with j, k).
c. Operational scenarios in which the setting variable J affects only the system and K is trivial
Here we provide quantum examples of types (c, 1), (c, 2), and (c, 3) .
Suppose that one of four possible states are prepared by implementing a transformation on the system, as follows. One applies a 'preparation' channel G j ⊗ id E , for j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and for G j : L(H S0 ) → L(H S1 ) , to the fiducial state |Φ
, where
and where {X j } j is the standard set of four Pauli matrices. In this case, there are four possible systemenvironment states, corresponding to the elements of the Bell basis,
Each of these has the same marginal on S 1 -the completely mixed state-so
Now suppose that the system-environment interaction consists of a measurement of the Bell basis on the systemenvironment composite, and then a repreparation of the system in a state depending on the outcome that was obtained,
where {τ j } j denotes an arbitrary set of four states on S 2 .
The input-output relation in this case, therefore, is easily verified to be
If the τ j depend nontrivially on j, then the relation is one-to-many, so we have an example of type 3. We can modify this example slightly to get one of type 2. Simply let the initial preparation channel on the system, G j , be a Pauli unitary with probability (1 − ) and a repreparation of an arbitrary stateσ j with probability :
where theσ j can be drawn from an arbitrary set of four states {σ j } j . In this case, the four initial systemenvironment states one generates are
The four corresponding marginals on S 1 are
The measurement of the Bell basis on the systemenvironment composite gives a uniform distribution over its outcomes if the joint state is of the formσ j ⊗ 1 2 1, so that applying Eq. (A4) with a set {τ j } j rather than {τ j } j to the state in Eq. (A7) gives the four final marginal states of the system τ j = (1 − )τ j + 1 4 jτ j . Taking 
The input-output relation in this case is therefore
Since both sets {σ j } j and {τ j } j are completely unconstrained sets of four states, one can certainly choose them (for any ) to satisfy condition 2. One can also choose them to satisfy condition 1, since a set of four states can be informationally complete for a two-dimensional Hilbert space. The simplest such construction would take the set {σ j } j to be an informationally complete set of pure states, = 2. the {ν j } j are more distinguishable than the {ω j } j 9 , so that Γ is necessarily a nonlinear map.
3. the ω j are independent of j (so ∀j : ω j =ω for some fixedω) but ν j varies nontrivially with j, so that the relation is one-to-many, and there can be no map Γ consistent with it.
We again demonstrate that all three of these failures occur in each of the three operational circuit types (listed as a, b, c in Appendix A).
a. Classical operational scenarios in which the setting variable J affects the system and the environment and K is trivial
Here we provide classical examples of types (a, 1), (a, 2), and (a, 3) .
If the setting variable J influences both the principal system and the environment, one can prepare any initial joint probability distribution on the system and environment. Then, as in the quantum case, one can easily generate any relation R at all, including all three types from above.
For example, taking the environment system to have dimension equal to the cardinality of the set {ω j } j , then for any set {ω j } j one can prepare the systemenvironment joint state ω j ⊗ [j] when J = j. The system and environment may then interact via the channel Γ S2|S1E ( S1E ) = j S1E δ j,E S1E (ν j ) S2 , for any set of states {ν j } j . Hence, for J = j the final marginal state of the system is ν j . Since both sets {ω j } j and {ν j } j are completely unconstrained, one can certainly satisfy the conditions of 1, 2, and 3. Suppose that the initial state of the systemenvironment composite is a maximally correlated probability distribution. By the natural classical analogue of the Hughston-Josza-Wootters theorem, it is possible, by implementing a j-dependent measurement on the system and post-selecting on outcome k, to steer the environment to any arbitrary probability distribution ν j,k (see footnote 7). Further, the update rule of the measurement (which affects only the system) can be arbitrary. Given an outcome k of the jth measurement, one can find an update rule which ignores the physical state of the system and simply reprepares the system in the state ω j,k . If the subsequent system-environment interaction is a swap gate, one can again generate the input-output relation R = {(ω j,k , ν j,k )} j,k for completely unconstrained sets {ω j,k } j,k and {ν j,k } j,k . Hence, one can certainly satisfy the conditions of 1, 2, and 3 (where j is replaced with j, k).
c. Classical operational scenarios in which the setting variable J affects only the system and K is trivial
Here we provide classical examples of types (c, 1), (c, 2), and (c, 3) .
Suppose that one of four possible states are prepared by implementing a transformation on the system, as follows. For setting j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, one applies a transformation Γ Πj ⊗ I to the fiducial state P S1E := [44] ), where I denotes the identity map and each Γ Πj is the map on probability distributions over system S 1 induced by the corresponding permutation of ontic states (in cycle notation):
In this case, there are four possible system-environment distributions, corresponding to four maximally correlated probability distributions,
Each of these has the same marginal on S 1 , namely, the uniform probability distribution
Now suppose that the system-environment interaction consists of a measurement distinguishing the supports of the maximally correlated states defined by Eq. (B2) (that is, a measurement whose outcome j can be associated to the response function δ Πj (S1),E ), followed by a repreparation of the system in the state ν j , thereby enacting the stochastic map
where {ν j } j denotes an arbitrary set of four probability distributions.
The input-output relation in this case is
If the ν j depend nontrivially on j, then the relation is one-to-many, so we have an example of type 3.
We can modify this example slightly to get one of type 2. Simply let the initial transformation Γ Πj on the system be generated by the permutation Π j of Eq. (B1) with probability (1 − ) and a repreparation of an arbitrary stateω j with probability , so that
In this case, the four initial system-environment states are
The marginals on S 1 are
The measurement defined above gives a uniform distribution over its outcomes if the joint probability distribution is of the form ω j ⊗ω, so that applying Eq. (B4) with ν j replaced byν j to the state in Eq. (B7) gives the four final marginal states of the system ν j = (1 − )ν j + jν j =ω as a simple special case, we have
Since both sets {ω j } j and {ν j } j are completely unconstrained sets of four states, one can certainly choose them (for any ) to satisfy condition 2.
One can also choose them to satisfy condition 1. As one example, let = 1 2 , and let theω j bẽ
,
The set {ω j } is a basis for the space of distributions over the 4 physical states. Let the ν j beν j = 2ω −ω j , so that
The relation in such circumstances is
There is a linear map which fits the input-output relation: it is given by the matrix
(acting on probability distributions over the four physical states of S 1 , expressed as four-component vectors). This linear map is not stochastic, since the elements in the matrix are not all positive. Because the set of input distributions in the relation form a basis for the space of all distributions over physical states, this is the unique linear map satisfying the relation. Hence, in such an example, the only linear map consistent with the standard argument is non-stochastic. Geometrically, the convex hull of the distributions in Eq. (B11) and Eq. (B12) forms an octahedron inside the 4-simplex of all probability distributions. The evolution map one finds by the standard argument (defined by Eq. (B13)) corresponds to a reflection through the origin, which is a reversible injective map. However, this map (extended uniquely by linearity to the whole space) does not correspond to a symmetry of the 4-simplex. Hence the linear map in this example does not correspond to any permutation of the physical states.
Appendix C: When does the evolution map coincide with the inference map classically?
Consider the classical circuit of Fig. 7(b) . Generally, it is possible to have inferences along a common cause pathway and therefore possible that the inference map might differ from the evolution map. What are the necessary and sufficient conditions on P S1E for them to be the same for all F S2E |S1E ? The answer is simply that E and S 1 must be marginally independent,
A sufficient condition for this independence to hold is that S 1 and E have no common ancestors in the causal structure. However, the independence relation can sometimes hold when this causal condition fails, for instance, using fine-tuned choices of circuit elements [25, 34] .
If one is considering a circuit that contains some variables which one is conditioning upon (like J and K in the examples we considered previously), then the sufficient condition for equality of the inference and evolution maps is simply that one must have S 1 independent of E after conditioning on these variables. It is worth noting that this provides another example (besides the possibility of fine-tuning) of how a statistical independence can hold in spite of the variables failing to have disconnected causal ancestry-in classical example 2, for instance, J is a common cause of S 1 and E, but if one conditions upon it, then S 1 and E become independent.
Therefore, the precise circumstances under which confusing inference and evolution has no consequences are when there are no initial system-environment correlations. In other words, the first mistake of the standard argument, conflating inference and evolution, is problematic precisely because the standard argument sought to address scenarios with such correlations.
Appendix D: Knowledge-dependence of evolution maps
We mentioned in Section 5 C and Section 6 that the classical and quantum evolution maps depend on one's knowledge of the state of the environment. We now provide several textbook examples of this phenomena, simply to show that it is not a cause for concern.
Consider encoding a single bit using a Vernam cypher (one-time pad). Let S be the bit to be encoded (the plaintext) and E the key, which is shared between the sender and the receiver. The value of E is sampled uniformly at random. To encode the plaintext, a controlled-NOT is implemented on S with the key E as control, as shown in Fig. 11 . Because the users of the cypher know the value of E, they describe the evolution of S, conditional on the value of E, as follows: if E = 0 the evolution map is the identity, while if E = 1 it is the bit-flip. An eavesdropper assigns to E the uniformly random distribution The knowledge-dependence of one's description of evolution is also seen in many protocols for quantum cryptography. For example, a private quantum channel on a qubit [66] can be implemented as follows. The sender and receiver share a uniformly random two-bit key. The sender draws a Pauli matrix from the set {I, X, Y, Z} based on the value of the key, and implements it on the system. To decode, the user applies the same Pauli. The users of the channel, who know the key's value, describe the evolution as ρ → σ i ρσ T i . An eavesdropper who does not know the key's value, but knows only that the key was drawn uniformly at random, describes the evolution as ρ → 1 2 1. As a final example, consider the transformation that a quantum state undergoes when it is measured. The map which one uses to update the state of the measured system depends on how much one knows about the outcome of the measurement. Consider for simplicity a rank-one projective measurement {Π k } k performed on some initial state ρ. If one has no information about which outcome occurred, then the correct update map is given by the non-selective update rule, ρ → k Π k ρΠ k . On the other hand, if one knows that outcome k occurred, then the correct update map is given by the selective update rule, ρ → Π k ρΠ k .
We now provide a derivation of the claims of Section 5 D, completing the analysis of the three classical examples from Sec. 3 and the mistakes of the standard argument when applied to them. For convenience, we represent the system-environment interaction in each case by the probabilistic dependence P S2|S1E = E P S2E |S1E , where P S2E |S1E is the conditional associated to the stochastic map F S2E |S1E ; we also indicate conditioning on J = j or K = k in the subscripts (e.g., P E|J=0 (e) := P E|J (e|0)).
Classical Example 3, from Section 3 E Consider again the third classical example, introduced in Section 3 E and discussed in Section 5 D.
As indicated by Eq. (75), the inference map from S 1 to S 2 for a particular value j of J is Γ (j) S2|S1 ( S1 ) = S1E P S2|S1E P E|S1J=j S1 .
Given the nature of the coupling of system and environment, we have P S2|S1E = δ S2,S1⊕2E .
Denote the early version of S 1 by S 0 . Then, because the joint distribution over S 0 and E is a state of perfect positive correlation with uniform marginals,
and because the controlled-NOT from J to S 0 is modeled by the conditional P S1|S0 = δ S1,S0⊕2J ,
a simple application of Bayesian probability theory implies that
δ E,S0 δ S0,S1⊕2J
= δ E,S1⊕2J .
Finally, substituting Eqs. (E2) and (E5) into Eq. (E1), we conclude that
S2|S1 ( S1 ) = S1E δ S2,S1⊕2E δ E,S1⊕2j S1 (E6)
This constitutes the proof of Eq. (76).
The correct evolution map in this example is straightforward to identify using the prescription of Section 4 A. For both values of J, the marginal state of the environment is uniformly random, so there is a unique evolution map. It is easily seen to be the randomization channel, which takes any input probability distribution P S1 to a uniformly random distribution on S 2 , as stated in Eq. (77).
Classical Example 2, from Section 3 D We start with Eq. (78), in the form
S2|S1 ( S1 ) = S1E P S2|S1E P E|J=j S1 .
Recalling the details of the example, one has P S2|S1E = δ S2,(S1⊕3E) .
Furthermore, because E simply tracks J, we have
Substituting these expressions into Eq. (E9), we conclude that
S2|S1 ( S1 ) = S1E δ S2,(S1⊕3E) δ E,J S1 (E12) = S1 δ S2,(S1⊕3j) S1 ,
confirming Eq. (79) Classical Example 1, from Section 3 C Here, both J and K are nontrivial. The causal structure is the same as that of Fig. 3 , and ensures that E is conditionally independent of S 1 given JK, P E|S1JK = P E|JK . Thus, the inference map for J = j and K = k is Γ (j,k) S2|S1 ( S1 ) = S1E P S2|S1E (P E|J=j,K=k ⊗ S1 ). (E14)
Because of the perfect correlation between S and E in the initial joint state, whatever one infers about S from learning that j = j and K = k, one learns the same thing about E as well. Consequently,
The system and environment interact via a swap, so
Substituting these expressions into Eq. (E14), we have
Γ (2,1)
The inference map for K = 1 and for the different values of J is simply the map that ignores the distribution on S 1 and outputs whatever distribution one infers for E as the distribution on S 2 . Clearly, therefore, the inference map is JK-dependent in this example. Recalling Eq. (41), one sees that each of the inputoutput pairs (for a given value of J when K = 1) is consistent with the corresponding inference map in Eqs. (E19)-(E21). But if one tries to find a single map that is consistent with all three input-output pairs, as the standard argument mistakenly suggests to do, one finds that no stochastic map can do the job.
As with example 2, it happens that the evolution map for any given values of J and K coincides with the inference map for those values because the causal structure is such that S 1 and E are conditionally independent given JK, so that an intervention on S 1 does not change the map after conditioning on JK,
Appendix F: The correct quantum evolution maps for scenarios with nontrivial J and K
Consider the scenario at play in the standard argument, shown in Fig. 2 . Following the prescription of Section 6, one obtains (for J = j and K = k) a map in the modified circuit given by
where ρ (j,k) E = Tr S1 (ρ (j,k) S1E ). Thus, by Eq. (81), the evolution map from S 1 to S 2 in the circuit of Fig. 2 , given that the setting variable has value j and the outcome was found to be k, is
